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Abstract
Export processing, in which a nal-good producer o¤shores the nal stage of production to an
assembly plant in a foreign country, has been an important part of developing nationseconomies.
It accounted for over half of total exports in countries such as China and Mexico. This paper
examines the determinants of vertical integration versus outsourcing in export processing, by
exploiting the coexistence of two export processing regimes in China, which designate by law
who owns and controls the imported components. Based on a variant of the Antràs-Helpman
(2004) model, we show theoretically that control over imported components for assembly can
a¤ect rm integration decisions. Our empirical results show that when Chinese plants control
the use of components, the export share of foreign-owned plants is positively correlated with
the intensity of inputs provided by the headquarter (capital, skill, and R&D). These results
are consistent with the property-rights theory of intra-rm trade. However, when foreign rms
own and control the components, there is no evidence of a positive relationship between the
intensity of headquarters inputs and the prevalence of vertical integration. The results are
consistent with our model that considers control over imported components as an alternative to
asset ownership to alleviate hold-up by export-processing plants.
Key Words: Intra-rm trade, Vertical integration, Export processing, Outsourcing
JEL Classication Numbers: F14, F23, L14
We are grateful to Eric Verhoogen (the co-editor), two anonymous referees, Pol Antràs, Alejandro Cuñat, Fabrice
Defever, Giovanni Facchini, Robert Feenstra, Giordano Mion, Emanuel Ornelas, Larry Qiu, Stephen Redding, Shang-
Jin Wei, Alan Winters, Stephen Yeaple and seminar participants at Clark, Colby, HKUST, Louvain, LSE, Nottingham,
Sussex, Trinity College Dublin and the World Bank, as well as conference participants at the CEPR First Meeting
of Globalization, Investment and Services Trade in Milan, the 2009 SAET Conference in Ischia, the 2009 ETSG
Conference in Rome, the 2010 Econometric Society World Congress in Shanghai and the 2010 APTS conference in
Osaka for insightful discussions and comments. We thank Randy Becker, Joseph Fan, Nathan Nunn and Peter Schott
for kindly sharing with us their data. We also thank Nu¢ eld Foundation and Hong Kong Research Grants Council
for nancial support. Fernandes thanks the CEP at the London School of Economics where part of this research was
conducted. Tang thanks the HKIMR where part of this research was conducted.
yEmail: a.p.o.fernandes@exeter.ac.uk
zEmail: heiwai.tang@tufts.edu
1
1 Introduction
Export processing, in which a nal-good producer o¤shores the nal stage of production to an
assembly plant in a foreign country, has been an important part of developing nationseconomies.
It employed over 63 million people in the developing world,1 and accounted for over half of total
exports in countries such as China and Mexico in recent years (Bergin et al, 2009). Recent studies
have shown how export processing and o¤shoring in general have important macroeconomic im-
pacts on the host countries.2 In export processing, nal-good producers are often confronted with
the decisions of whether to outsource to or integrate with the foreign assembly plant, which in
turn a¤ect the macroeconomic e¤ects of o¤shoring. This paper studies the prevalence of vertical
integration versus outsourcing in export processing using detailed product-level trade data from
Chinas Customs.
We exploit the special regulatory regimes governing processing trade in China. These legal
arrangements designate by law which party of a global production relationship has control rights
over the imported materials, which are critical for export processing. Specically, export process-
ing in China has been governed under two regimes since the early 1980s, which are referred to
as pure-assembly and import-assembly.3 The main di¤erence between the two regimes lies in the
allocation of control rights of the imported inputs. In the pure-assembly regime, a foreign rm sup-
plies components to a Chinese assembly plant and retains ownership and control over the imported
inputs throughout the production process. In the import-assembly regime, a Chinese assembly
plant imports components of its own accord and retains control over their use. Based on a variant
of the Antràs-Helpman (2004) model that incorporates component-purchase investments, we pro-
vide empirical evidence on how control over imported inputs may serve as an alternative to asset
ownership to mitigate hold-up by foreign suppliers, which in turn shape the organizational choices
of multinational production.4
While there is an extensive theoretical literature on the pattern of intra-rm trade, empirical
evidence is relatively scant and exclusively focuses on the developed world.5 This paper thus com-
plements the existing literature by providing evidence on the make-or-buy decisions in processing
trade in a developing country. In particular, our results empirically examine existing theory on
1See International Labour Organization (2007).
2For instance, Bergin et al. (2009, 2011) link o¤shoring activities to higher employment volatility in Mexico; and
Sheng and Yang (2011) study how exporting processing activities contribute to increasing returns to skills in China
after its accession to the WTO.
3See Feenstra and Hanson (2005) for a detailed description of these two trade regimes in China.
4We take the property-rights approach to study the determinants of vertical integration. The determinants of
multinational rm boundaries can be analyzed by other theories of the rm. Existing research has applied the
incentive-systems approach of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), and the authority-delegation approach of Aghion and
Tirole (1997) to study the general equilibrium patterns of foreign integration and outsourcing. For the incentive-
systems approach, see Grossman and Helpman (2004), among others. For the authority-delegation approach, see
Marin and Verdier (2008, 2009) and Puga and Treer (2003), among others.
5Seminal work includes McLaren (2000), Antràs (2003, 2005), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005),
Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008). See Helpman (2006) for a summary of the theoretical literature, and Hummels
et al. (2001) for the evidence of the tremendous growth of trade in intermediate inputs. More recent studies include
Conconi et al. (2008) and Ornelas and Turner (2009), among others. See Antràs (2011) for a survey of the literature.
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the relationship between industry characteristics and the relative prevalence of vertical integration
versus outsourcing (Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004, 2008). Since this literature so far
abstracted from the discussion of control rights of imported components, which are particularly im-
portant for processing trade in developing countries, we extend the Antràs-Helpman (2004) model
to capture the policy features in China. In the model, the nal-good producer in the North invests
in headquarter services (e.g. marketing), while the assembly plant in the South invests in assembly
activities. Who invests in global component purchase depends on the trade regime. In particular,
the nal-good producer invests in component purchases under pure-assembly, whereas the assembly
plant invests in component purchases under import-assembly.
Our model, which features rm heterogeneity, predicts that vertical integration and outsourc-
ing in both import-assembly and pure-assembly regimes can coexist in sectors where headquarter
investments are important. In particular, our model predicts that the most productive nal-good
producers in the North choose to integrate with the assembly plant and own the imported materials
when o¤shoring assembly tasks to the South, whereas the least productive nal-good producers al-
locate both the ownership of the plants asset and the control rights over imported materials to the
assembly plant. Based on this ranking of production modes, the model yields a positive correlation
between the export share of integrated rms that operate under import-assembly and headquarter
intensity across sectors, consistent with the main prediction by Antràs (2003). The cross-sector
relationship between headquarter intensity and the prevalence of integration under pure-assembly
is ambiguous. The reason for the ambiguity is that in a headquarter-intensive sector where safe-
guarding the headquarters investment incentives is important, a foreign client can choose to either
own and control imported inputs or own the plants assets to alleviate hold-up. The export volume
from integrated plants increases for both import-assembly and pure-assembly when the headquarter
intensity of the sector rises. If the incremental gain from integration is su¢ ciently smaller with
input control than without, the export volume can increase more for the former than the latter,
resulting in a lower share of integrated plants under pure-assembly in total processing trade.
We investigate empirically the implications of introducing controls over input purchases on the
prevalence of di¤erent global production modes in processing trade. To this end, we use detailed
rm- and product-level trade data collected by the Customs General Administration of China for
2005. We nd a positive and signicant relationship between the share of integrated plantsexports
from the import-assembly regime and various measures of the intensity of headquarter inputs (i.e.,
skill, R&D, and physical capital intensities). The results are robust when we restrict the sample
to include only Chinese exports to the US and to di¤erent country groups based on income levels,
as well as when country xed e¤ects are controlled for. In sum, we nd evidence supporting our
predictions and the property-rights theory of intra-rm trade.
However, we nd no evidence of a positive relationship between the degree of headquarter
intensity and integrated plants exports from the pure-assembly regime, where the foreign rm
retains ownership and control rights over the imported inputs. These results provide indirect
support to our theoretical prediction that control over the use of imported components serves as an
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alternative to asset ownership to mitigate hold-up by foreign assembly plants. It is worth noting
that this result should not be taken as a rejection of the existing theory on intra-rm trade, but
rather as a conrmation of its predictions in a more complex setting.
Our paper relates to several strands of studies. First, our work is most related to and to a large
extent inspired by Feenstra and Hanson (2005), who are the rst to exploit the special regulatory
arrangements for processing trade in China to examine empirically the prevalence of integration
in processing trade. Similar to their work, we also adopt the property-rights theory of the rm to
rationalize the determinants of integration. Di¤erent from theirs, we adopt the general-equilibrium
framework of Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) that pins down the relationship
between industry characteristics, productivity heterogeneity, and the prevalence of vertical integra-
tion. By solving for the export share of each production mode in Chinese export processing, our
theoretical predictions are largely consistent with their partial-equilibrium insights. Feenstra and
Hanson estimate their model structurally, by exploring the variation in market thickness and court
e¢ ciency across Chinese regions.6 We instead focus on the sectoral determinants of the prevalence
of integration based on a more reduced-form but more general empirical model.
Using data from assembly trade in a developing country, our paper adds to the existing empirical
literature on the determinants of arms-length trade versus vertical integration in developed coun-
tries. Antràs (2003), Yeaple (2006), Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2008), and Nunn and
Treer (2011) are important precursors in this literature. They examine the e¤ects of headquarters
inputs, productivity dispersion and contractibility of inputs on intra-rm imports as a share of
total imports in the U.S. Bernard et al. (2008) use a new measure of product contractibility based
on the importance of intermediaries in international trade. Nunn and Treer (2011) explore the
varying degree of relationship specicity of di¤erent kinds of physical capital, and use new data to
take into account U.S. intra-rm imports that are shipped from foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries.
Recent studies use rm-level data to examine empirically the theory of intra-rm trade. Defever
and Toubal (2007) and Corcos et al. (2008) provide evidence from France, while Kohler and Smolka
(2009) provide evidence from Spain. These studies nd empirical support for the predictions of
productivity ranking across production modes that involve di¤erent ownership arrangements.
In these empirical studies, imports within multinationalsboundaries are assumed to be shipped
from foreign subsidiaries to the headquarters. However, it has been argued that a signicant share
of the intra-rm imports originates from the foreign headquarters of U.S. subsidiaries, especially
from rich countries (Nunn and Treer, 2011). Our paper considers exports from export processing
assembly plants who produce exclusively for sales in countries where the headquarters are located.
By focusing on exports from the subsidiaries to the multinational headquarters, we hope to obtain
cleaner results to validate the existing theoretical models, which have so far focused primarily on
the sourcing decisions of the headquarters in the North.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey discusses the background of export processing
6There is also a literature that studies the spatial determinants of FDI, such as supplier and market access. See,
among others, Head and Mayer (2004) for evidence from Europe and Amiti and Javorcik (2008) for evidence from
China. Our analysis abstracts away from these spatial determinants.
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in China. Section 3 develops the theoretical model for our empirical investigation. Section 4
describes the data for our analysis. Section 5 presents empirical results. The last section concludes.
2 Export Processing in China
To acquire foreign technology, boost employment, and stimulate economic growth, the Chinese
government has implemented various policies to promote exports and foreign direct investment
since the early 1980s. One of the key policies is to provide tax incentives to encourage processing
trade, which has been regulated by Chinas Customs under two regimes: pure-assembly and import-
assembly.7 Since then, export processing has been a main driver of the impressive export growth in
China. Table 1 shows that export processing accounted for about 57 percent of Chinas total exports
in 2005 and over 80 percent of foreign-invested enterprisesexports. Between the two processing
regimes, import-assembly accounted for 45.5 percent of Chinas total exports, with pure-assembly
contributing only 11.5 percent. Table 2 shows the distribution of processing export volume across
the four production modes this paper studies. 78 percent of processing exports was accounted
for by import-assembly, under which the Chinese assembly plants control the purchase and the
use of imported inputs. Foreign-invested plants accounted for 76 percent (i.e., 59.71/ 78.11) of the
import-assembly exports, and for 44 percent of the pure-assembly exports (9.67/21.89). In sum, the
"split" structure, which involves the foreign investor owning the plants assets and the assembly
plant controlling (not necessarily owning) the imported inputs, is the most common production
mode in Chinese processing trade. This production arrangement is also emphasized by Feenstra
and Hanson (2005).
There are a number of important di¤erences between the two regimes that matter for our
analysis. The rst di¤erence is related to the responsibilities of the Chinese plant. This di¤erence
is also what denes the regime types. Under pure-assembly, the main role of a Chinese manager is
assembling. A foreign nal-good producer supplies a Chinese assembly plant with all intermediate
inputs from abroad. The plant simply assembles inputs into nal products for exports. Under
import-assembly, an assembly plant is responsible for purchasing intermediate inputs from abroad,
instead of passively receiving them from the foreign client. An import-assembly plant is obliged to
arrange the shipment and the storage of the imported inputs in bonded warehouses.
The second di¤erence is about the ownership and control over inputs and thus the outside op-
tions of each party. Under pure-assembly, the foreign client owns and controls the inputs throughout
the production process. The Chinese plant may be given temporary control rights, but will never
have ownership of the inputs. Under import-assembly, the assembly plant controls the imported
inputs throughout the production process. The imported inputs have to be stored in bonded
7Processing rms import intermediate inputs duty free, as long as the produced output is exported. They are also
exempted for value-added taxes. Since imports are duty-free, rms have high incentives to apply to operate their
production units under either of the regimes. Therefore, Chinas customs is particularly restrictive about the use
of imported materials by the processing plants. Monthly reports need to be delivered to the customs to show that
imported materials are used solely for export processing. Readers are referred to Naughton (1996) and Feenstra and
Hanson (2005) for a more detailed description of the two regulatory regimes.
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warehouses, which are under close and frequent supervision by China Customs.8 Upon approval,
the plant can use the inputs with other foreign clients. In this sense, the import-assembly plant
generally has a higher outside option than a pure-assembly plant.9
The third di¤erence has to do with the approval standards. Due to the exibility of using the
imported materials for multiple foreign clients, assembly plants would have larger incentives to
register as an import-assembly plant. In practice, it is generally more di¢ cult to obtain a license to
operate under this regime. Moreover, the Chinese authorities require the import-assembly plants
to maintain a certain standard for both accounting practices and warehouse facilities. For pure-
assembly plants, there is no corresponding requirement. Under both regimes, an assembly plant
needs to show the Chinese authorities the terms of transactions specied in written contracts every
month. As such, the Chinese government imposes frequent checks on the behavior of the plant and
ensures that it follows the requirements for each regime.10
The assembly plant under either regime can be independent or foreign-owned. Several remarks
about foreign ownership (integration) are in order. Under the Chinese governments classication,
a rm that has over 25 percent foreign equity is considered as foreign. It can be argued that
equity ownership is positively related to control. However, our theoretical model does not equate
foreign ownership with foreign control. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson
(2005), foreign ownership in our model simply means that the foreign owner has property rights of
the plants residual prots. Control rights over processing activities always reside with the assembly
plant. Under import-assembly, the input-purchase decisions are always made independently by the
assembly plant, even for those that are foreign-owned. In the theoretical model below, we specify
formally, using a property-rights model, how a headquarter rm can inuence the decisions of its
subsidiary.11
8 If an import-assembly assembly plant is owned by a foreign investor, the investor does have residual rights of both
the plants assets and inventory of intermediate inputs. What we emphasize here is the control rights over inputs. One
may argue that for foreign-owned rms under import-assembly, the Chinese Customs may not be able to enforce the
input-purchase decisions made solely by the assembly plant. Article 9 of Regulations Concerning Customs Supervi-
sion and Control over the Inward Processing and Assembling Operation (Amended)(http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/)
says the following: "The processing enterprises concerned shall, in the special book accepted by the Customs, keep
detailed records of the disposal of the materials, parts and equipment imported and the nished products exported
under the contract. The Customs shall, at any time deemed necessary, examine the relevant books and correspon-
dence as well as bonded warehouses and workshops, and the processing enterprise shall provide the customs with
necessary facilities."
9See Feenstra and Hanson (2005) and Measures on the Administration of the Customs of the Peoples Re-
public of China for Bonded Warehouse Factory Engaged in Processing Trade, Customs General Administration
(http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/).
10See Regulations Concerning Customs Supervision and Control over the Inward Processing and Assembling
Operation,Customs General Administration (http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/).
11 In practice, the plants input-purchase decisions can be inuenced by the the foreign headquarter in other ways.
For instance, the current incomplete-contracting model can be extended to allow partial contractibility, in which the
headquarter rm can sign a (employment) contract to specify the level of investment of certain activities.
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3 A Theoretical Model
3.1 Model Setup
To guide our empirical analysis that involves four production modes (outsourcing versus integration,
import-assembly versus pure-assembly), we develop a heterogeneous-rm model based on Antràs
and Helpman (2004). We incorporate investment decisions for input purchases, which are important
in processing trade. Similar to Feenstra and Hanson (2005), we postulate that in export process-
ing, control over imported inputs provides incentivizing e¤ects similar to asset ownership. We
formally analyze the organizational choices of multinational production involving assembly plants
in developing countries, when ownership of the plantsassets as well as control rights over imported
inputs are to be chosen simultaneously by the nal-good producer. We highlight the key features
that deliver the main empirical predictions, referring the readers to the appendix and Antràs and
Helpman for details.
Our assumptions of preferences, market structure, and rm heterogeneity are similar to Melitz
(2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). Consider an environment in which all consumers
have the same constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences over di¤erentiated products. A rm
that produces a brand of a di¤erentiated product faces the following demand function
q = Dp 
1
1  ; 0 <  < 1
where p and q stand for price and quantity, respectively; D measures the demand level for the
di¤erentiated products in the rms sector; and  is a parameter that determines the demand
elasticity of the brand.12
In our model, production requires non-cooperative investments by the nal-good producer (H)
in the North and the assembly plant (A) in the South. Specically, nal goods are produced
with three inputs: input-purchasing activities m, assembly activities a and headquarter services h,
according to the following production function:
q = 

m
m
m  a
a
a  h
h
h
; (1)
where  is rm productivity, 0 < m < 1, 0 < a < 1 and h = 1   m   a.13 All 0s are
sector-specic parameters. A higher value of k implies a more intensive use of factor k. In the
12 =  1

; where  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), the utility
function that delivers such a demand function for a rm is
U = q0 +
1

JX
j=1
Z
i2

qj (i)
 di
 

,
where q0 is consumption of a homogenous good; j is an index representing a di¤erentiated product; i is an index
representing a particular brand,  is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
di¤erentiated products.  is assumed to be smaller than , i.e., products are less substitutable than varieties.
13One can think of a, m and h as quality-adjusted e¤ect units of inputs, with all quantities normalized to 1.
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context of processing trade, a is always chosen by A in the South, while h is always chosen by H in
the North. Denote by wN the unit cost of investment in h , and by wS < wN that for investment
in a in the South.
Depending on the trade regime under which the joint production unit operates, either A or H
can invest in input purchases. Under pure-assembly, H invests in both headquarter activities (h)
and input purchases (m), while A invests only in assembly activities (a). Under import-assembly,
H invests in h, while A invests in both a and m. This arrangement has also been analyzed by
Feenstra and Hanson (2005).
For simplicity, we focus on the analysis of Hs decisions between foreign outsourcing and foreign
vertical integration (i.e., FDI), leaving out the analysis on the domestic sourcing modes for which we
do not have data. Irrespective of the trade regime, components are always imported from abroad,
reecting what the export processing plants do.
A foreign client H can choose to source assembly tasks either under the pure-assembly regime
(N) or under the import-assembly regime (S); and within each regime, H can choose to outsource
(O) to an assembly plant or integrate (V ) with it. In sum, there are altogether four production
modes that H can operate her production, denoted in short-hand notation by NV , NO, SV and
SO.
Denote by flk the xed costs in terms of Ns labor units for trade regime l and organization form
k, where l 2 fS;Ng and k 2 fV;Og. We assume that the xed cost for integration is higher than
that for outsourcing within each trade regime (i.e., flV > flO for l = S;N), following Antràs and
Helpman (2004).14 Furthermore, we assume that pure-assembly is associated with a higher xed
cost than import-assembly for both organizational modes (i.e., fNk > fSk for k = O or V ). This
implies that pure-assembly entails higher overhead xed costs for managing overseas procurement
sta¤ and transporting intermediate inputs to China, compared to import-assembly. However, one
can argue for the opposite ranking based on higher accounting and warehouse standards required
by the Chinese customs for import-assembly (see section 2). By assuming fNk > fSk for k = O or
V , we essentially assume that the extra overhead costs for pure-assembly exceed those associated
with licensing and maintaining the required standards for import-assembly. In sum, we have the
following ranking of xed costs fs:15
fNV > fNO > fSV > fSO: (2)
As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2005), the division of ex-post
surplus from the relationship are determined by Nash bargaining. Denote by  2 (0; 1) the primitive
14How the xed costs f 0ks di¤er across organization modes k deserves more discussion. On the one hand, more
management e¤ort is needed to monitor overseas employees in an integrated rm. On the other hand, there may
exist economies of scope over managerial activities under vertical integration. By assuming that fV > fO, Antràs
and Helpman (2004) essentially assume that managerial overload from managing overseas employees o¤sets the cost
advantage arising from economies of scope of these activities
15We assume that the total xed costs for each production mode are the sum of various xed costs. One can argue
that economies of scope can also arise from producing in an integrated rm under pure-assembly, and that fNV < fSV
and fNV < fNO. For simplicity, we do not explore these possibilities.
8
bargaining power of H, and by (1  ) that of A.
3.1.1 Equilibrium
We solve the model backwards for the subgame-perfect equilibrium for a rm, taking sector-level
variables as given. Based on the demand function above, the revenue of the joint production unit
between the nal-good producer and the assembly plant is
R (m;a; h) = D1 

m
m
m  a
a
a  h
h
h
: (3)
At the bargaining stage, the outside option of each party depends on both the organizational form
(V or O) as well as the trade regime (N or S). Di¤erent outside options in turn a¤ect the de-facto
shares of the ex-post surplus for each party. We now discuss the resulting surplus under di¤erent
production modes.
Pure-Assembly In the pure-assembly regime, H retains ownership and control rights over the
imported components. If H decides to vertically integrate with the assembly plant A (the NV
mode), H retains the right to re the manager of A and seize her relationship-specic inputs. If
bargaining fails, H can then use As inputs to assemble the imported components into nished
products with another plant. However, to the extent that A has accumulated relationship-specic
assets, she is more e¢ cient than an outside manager. H therefore incurs an e¢ ciency loss in
production without A. To x ideas, we assume that H can complete only a fraction  2 (0; 1)
of the original output, implying an outside option (threat point) of R < R. Without loss of
generality, As outside option is normalized to 0. In other words, As investments are assumed to
be completely specic to H, as in Antràs and Helpman (2004).16
In the case of outsourcing, if bargaining fails, H does not own As assets to complete production.
Her outside option is normalized to 0 symmetrically. It can be argued that given Hs ownership
of imported components in this regime, she can use the components to produce with another
plant. What we have in mind here is that once the components are shipped to A, the value of the
components drops signicantly.17 Normalizing Hs outside option to 0 is a simplifying assumption.
Our results are robust to an assumption of a positive but su¢ ciently low outside option for H.18
Denote by NV Hs expected share of the joint surplus under integration, with (1  NV ) being
the expected share for A. Similarly, denote by NO Hs expected share of the joint surplus under
16 If inputs are only partially specic to the relationship, As outside option needs not be 0. This assumption is
to simplify analysis, and the main insight of the paper is independent of the assumption of complete specicity. See
Antràs and Helpman (2008) for an analysis that allows for partial specicity of investments.
17One can also argue that outside the relationship with A, H can capitalize the business networks or other intangible
assets associated with input purchases. Once the inputs are shipped to A, Hs experience in input-purchasing
and business network with foreign input-suppliers probably do not enhance Hs threat point and thus her ex-post
bargaining weight.
18Specically, as long as control over components raises A0s outside option more than Hs, all of our theoretical
predictions hold.
9
outsourcing. The above discussion implies the following:
NV = 
 +  (1  ) > NO = :
Denote by wNN the cost of component purchases, where N captures Hs e¢ ciency in procur-
ing components. Under pure-assembly, H solves max
m;h
fNkR (m;a; h)  wNNm  wNhg,
whereas A solves max
a
f(1  Nk)R (m;a; h)  wSag. For organizational form k 2 fV;Og, solv-
ing Hs and As problems simultaneously gives the prot-maximizing levels a, h and m in terms
of wS , wN , , , D, s and importantly, Nk. Using the solutions to the problems and (3), we can
express the joint production units prots as
Nk = D Nk   wNfNk; (4)
where    1  , fNk is the xed cost of production and
 Nk =
1   Nkm + Nkh + (1  Nk) a
(N )
m


wS
1 Nk
a 
wN
Nk
h+m 1  .
 Nk reaches its maximum when
N (
a) =
(1  a) (1  a) pa (1  a) (1  a) (1   (1  a))
1  2a ;
where 0N (a) < 0. Given that a = 1  
 
h + m

, 0N
 
h + m

> 0. A higher headquarter-
intensity is associated with a higher optimal N (a).
Import-Assembly In the import-assembly regime, A invests in input purchases and business
relationships with overseas component suppliers. If bargaining fails, A can capitalize her intangible
assets associated with the input procurement activities by working with another rm in the North.
Similar to Feenstra and Hanson (2005), we assume, admittedly in an abstract fashion, that A
obtains a share  2 (0; 1) of revenue when bargaining fails, independent of the production units
ownership structure.
Similar to the discussion above, in an integrated rm, H can seize As assets to complete
production with a third-party plant if bargaining fails. She then obtains an outside option of
R. In the case of outsourcing, H does not own either As assets or components. Her outside
option, similar to outsourcing under pure-assembly, is normalized to 0. However, A can capitalize
her intangible asset associated with input-purchasing experience, obtaining an outside option of
R. Let us denote by SV and SO Hs expected shares of the joint surplus for integration and
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outsourcing under import-assembly, respectively. We have:19
SV =  (1  ) + (1  )  > SO =  (1  ) .
Note that NV > SV > SO. If we further assume that asset ownership is su¢ ciently more
e¤ective in alleviating hold-up by the assembly plant, that is,  (1  ) > , we have SV =
 (1  ) + (1  )  >  = NO.
The input purchasing cost in this regime is wSS , where S captures As e¢ ciency in procuring
components. Anticipating ex-post bargaining, H solves max
h
fSkR (m;a; h)  wNhg,
whereas A solves max
a;m
f(1  Sk)R (m;a; h)  wSSm  wSag : For organizational form k 2
fV;Og, solving Hs and As problems simultaneously gives the prot-maximizing investment levels
a, h and m in terms of wS , wN , S , N , , D, s, and Sk. Using these solutions and equation
(3), we obtain the joint production units prots for organization mode k under import-assembly
as
Sk = D Sk   wNfSk, (5)
where    1  , and
 Sk =
1   Skh + (1  Sk)  1  h
(S)
m


wS
1 Sk
1 h 
wN
Sk
h 1  :
 Sk reaches its maximum when
S

h

=
h
 
1    1  h ph (1  h) (1  h) (1   (1  h))
2h   1 :
Notice that 0S
 
h

> 0. A higher headquarter-intensity is associated with a higher optimal
S
 
h

.
3.1.2 Choosing Optimal Production Modes
Conditional on staying in the market, H chooses the production mode to maximize her objective
as follows:


D; a; h

= max
l2fN;Sg;k2fV;Og
lk

D; a; h

.
This also turns out to be the expected prot of the joint production unit.20 Hs choices depend on
the slopes of lk ( s) and the xed costs flks for di¤erent production modes lk.
Recall that for a given m, 0N (a) < 0 and 
0
S (
a) < 0. Thus, lO is preferred to lV within
each trade regime l 2 fN;Sg for su¢ ciently low a. In words, in an assembly-intensive sector
19Table 3 summarizes the ex-post bargaining weights for each of the four production modes.
20Upon matching up, H pays A an ex-ante transfer. An inelastic supply of As implies that H will adjust the
transfer to make the latter just indi¤erent between joining the production unit and staying out. The payo¤ of
staying-out is associated with a certain payo¤ of 0. Under these circumstances, Hs ex-ante objective turns out to be
exactly the same as the joint production units prots.
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Figure 1: Co-existence of four production modes in a headquarter-intensive sector
(i.e., a sector that has l (a) 6 lO < lV for l 2 fN;Sg), integration would not be chosen as an
optimal production mode.
On the other hand, in a headquarter-intensive sector (i.e., a sector that has l (a) > lV > lO
for l 2 fN;Sg), both integration and outsourcing can be the optimal organization modes within
each regime. Figure 1, which plots rmsprots on productivity, illustrates our baseline case when
all four production modes coexist in a headquarter-intensive sector. Firms with productivity term
 below the cuto¤ SO exit, those with  2 [SO;SV ) outsource under import-assembly, those
with  2 [SV ;NO) integrate under import-assembly, those with  2 [NO;NV ) outsource
under pure-assembly, and nally those with   NV integrate under pure-assembly.
The coexistence of all four production modes implies a specic ranking of  0lks. Within each
trade regime, since integration always gives more investment incentives to the headquarter,  lV >
 lO for l 2 fN;Sg. Recall that the ranking of  0lks ultimately depends on 0Sks and the input prices:
wN , wS , N , and S . On the one hand, for a given organizational mode (k), giving Hs control over
imported inputs under pure-assembly gives her more incentives to invest in headquarter activities
compared with import-assembly (i.e.,  Sk <  Nk). On the other hand, lower wS can make As
procurement of imported inputs and thus import-assembly more attractive than pure-assembly for
H. For a given component intensity m, assuming su¢ ciently low marginal costs of input purchases
in the North relative to the South (see appendix for a formal statement),21 we have the following
21 In Antràs and Helpman (2004), production modes in the North are associated with highest bargaining weights
than those for the South. But then they assume that high wages in the North would make the South production
modes more protable in terms of operating prots.
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ranking of protability:
 NV >  NO >  SV >  SO; (6)
which supports the sorting of rms into di¤erent production modes illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose
As marginal cost of input purchasing is su¢ ciently low (e.g., low wS), pure-assembly is dominated
by import-assembly, the ranking of  s can become  SV >  SO >  NV >  NO. Given the
ranking assumption of xed costs (2), there would be no plants operating under pure-assembly in
equilibrium. Importantly, our main empirical results do not depend on assumption (6).
3.1.3 Export Shares
To derive closed-form expressions for the export shares in each trade mode, we follow Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and assume a Pareto distribution of , with cumulative distribution
function G () = 1 

min


, where  > 2 and   min > 0. Since integration is never chosen in
an assembly-intensive sector, the market share of integrated exports is 0. The productivity cuto¤s
for each production mode can be obtained by solving a set of indi¤erence conditions. For instance,
H with productivity parameter SV should be indi¤erent between the SV mode and the NO mode,
i.e., SV (NO) = NO (NO). Solving the set of indi¤erence conditions gives:
SO =
BfSO
 SO
; SV =
B (fSV   fSO)
 SV    SO
NO =
B (fNO   fSV )
 NO    SV
; NV =
B (fNV   fNO)
 NV    NO
;
where B = wN=D. Our baseline ranking assumptions (2) and (6) guarantee that all these cuto¤s
are positive.
Under the distribution assumption of , the export value of each production mode can then be
solved as:
XSO = D 'SO
 
1 SO  1 SV

; XSV = D 'SV
 
1 SV  1 NO

XNO = D 'NO
 
1 NO  1 NV

; XNV = D 'NV
1 
NV ;
where    min 1 . Before analyzing the relationship between h and the export share of each
production mode, let us introduce the following lemma that help us prove the main results of the
paper.
Lemma For organization mode k,
d

ln
 Nk
 Sk

dh
 0:
Proof: See appendix.
Similarly, we can show that
d

ln
 lV
 lO

dh
 0 for trade regime l; and since we assume that asset
ownership is more e¤ective in alleviating hold-up compared to input control (i.e., SV > NO), we
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can show that
d

ln
 SV
 NO

dh
 0.
The export share of integrated import-assembly processing plants in total processing exports
can be expressed as
sSV =
XSVP
l=N;S;k=V;OXlk
=

XSO
XSV
+
XNO
XSV
+
XNV
XSV
+ 1
 1
; (7)
whereas the export share of integrated pure-assembly plants in total processing exports is
sNV =
XNVP
l=N;S;k=V;OXlk
=

XSO
XNV
+
XNO
XNV
+
XSV
XNV
+ 1
 1
: (8)
Simple comparative statics show that XSOXSV ,
XNO
XSV
, XSOXNV , and
XNO
XNV
are all decreasing in h.22
Thus, we know that the export share of foreign-owned plants (sSV + sNV ) is increasing in h. This
result implies that either sSV , sNV , or both need to be increasing in h.
The ratio XSVXNV , which appears in both (7) and (8) but in a reverse manner, plays a key role in
determining the relationship between h, sNV , and sSV .23 However, the impact of a higher h on
XNV
XSV
is ambiguous since 'NV'SV is increasing in 
h, but NVNO is also increasing in 
h whereas NVSV can
be increasing or decreasing in h.
Figure 2 depicts how the productivity cuto¤s lk and the envelope of rmsprots (captured
by  lk) move when 
h increases. It shows that XSV (the area enclosed by the prot envelope, SV ,
and NO) and XNV (the area enclosed by the prot envelope, NV ; and NO) both expand when
h increases. The impact of a higher h on NVSV and thus the relation between 
h and sSV and
that between h and sNV are ambiguous. Graphically, if the decline of NV is su¢ ciently less than
that of SV (see appendix for a formal statement),
d

XSV
XNV

dh
can be su¢ ciently positive so that sSV
is increasing in h while sNV is decreasing in h (see inequality (13) in the appendix).
Intuitively, a su¢ ciently large increase in XSVXNV requires integration to be associated with a su¢ -
ciently smaller rise in the production units protability when imported components are controlled
by H (pure-assembly) than by A (import-assembly). As such, the export share of import-assembly
foreign-invested plants over total processing exports increases in h, whereas the share of foreign
rms in the pure-assembly regime declines. While our model proposes that input control is less
e¤ective than asset ownership in alleviating hold-up by assembly plants, it does serve as an al-
ternative for that purpose. When the headquarter intensity of production increases, a nal-good
producer who designates an assembly plant to procure components (import-assembly) would be
more vulnerable to hold-up than those who at least control the inputs (pure-assembly). Thus, the
gain from integration is larger for a nal-good producer who does not have input-control than one
22 XSO
XSV
= 'SO
'SV

SV
SO
 1 1
1 

SV
NO
 1 ; XNOXSV = 'NO'SV
1 

NO
NV
 1

NO
SV
 1 1 ; XSOXNV = 'SO'NV

NV
SO
 1 
1 

SO
SV
 1
; XNO
XNV
=
'NO
'NV

NV
NO
 1
  1

.
23 XSV
XNV
= 'SV
'NV

NV
SV
 1
 

NV
NO
 1
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of the comparative statics of an increase in h on  s and the
productivity cuto¤s.
who does. Our results resonate with a key theoretical result in Feenstra and Hanson (2005), who
show that the increase in the returns to giving the assembly plant control over inputs is larger
when the plant does not own assets than when it does. Based on this theoretical result, the authors
rationalize the prevalence of the "split" ownership structure in Chinas processing trade, as Table
2 also shows.
We will use disaggregated product-level data to examine the following theoretical prediction.
Prediction 1: Headquarter Intensity and the Prevalence of Vertical Integration
1. The export share of vertically integrated (VI) plants in total export processing is increasing
in the sectors headquarter intensity (h).
2. If the incremental gain from integration is su¢ ciently smaller with input control than without,
the export share of VI plants under import-assembly is increasing in h, whereas that under
pure-assembly is decreasing in h.
Notice that if we examine the fractions of di¤erent types of plants in total number of processing
plants (Nlk=N) like in Antràs and Helpman (2004), the fractions of NV and SV are both increasing
in h. Specically, NSO=N = 1 

SO
SV

; NSV =N =

SO
SV
 h
1 

SV
NO
i
; NNO=N =

SO
NO
 
SO
NV

; NNV =N =

NO
NV

. Given data on export volume, we use export shares, instead of
fractions of exporters in each production mode, as the dependent variable to examine Prediction 1
below.
Our model also predicts that in a headquarter-intensive sector, rms under pure-assembly are
more productive than those under import-assembly. Moreover, only the most productive rms nd
it protable to engage in vertical integration under pure-assembly. Specically, our model predicts
that when the distribution of rm productivity becomes more dispersed (i.e., more clustered on
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the right tail), the export share of integrated plants in the pure-assembly regime should increase.
However, the relationship is ambiguous in the import-assembly regime. We will also examine the
following prediction (see appendix for the proof).
Prediction 2: Productivity Dispersion and the Prevalence of Vertical Integration In
a headquarter-intensive sector, a higher rm productivity dispersion is associated with a larger
export share of the foreign rms that operate in the pure-assembly regime. The relationship is
ambiguous under the import-assembly regime, and is absent in an assembly-intensive sector.
4 Data
To examine the determinants of vertical integration in di¤erent trade regimes in China, we use trade
data from the Customs General Administration of the Peoples Republic of China for 2005.24 The
data report values in US dollars for imports and exports of over 7,000 products in the HS 6-digit
classication,25 from and to over 200 destinations around the world, by type of enterprise (out of 9
types, e.g. state owned, foreign invested, sino-foreign joint venture), region or city in China where
the product was exported from or imported to (out of around 700 locations), customs regime (out
of 18 regimes, e.g. "Processing and Assembling" and "Processing with Imported Materials").26
In this paper we use data for processing trade which is classied according to the special customs
regimes "Processing and Assembling" (pure-assembly) and "Processing with Imported Materials"
(import-assembly). Regular trade is classied by China Customs Statistics according to the regime
"Ordinary Trade".
We use two dependent variables. The rst one is the share of processing exports from foreign-
owned assembly plants over total processing exports at the HS 6-digit product level (or product-
country level). The second one is the share of processing exports from foreign-owned assembly
plants in each trade regime l = N; S (pure-assembly or import-assembly, respectively) separately
over total processing exports at the HS 6-digit product level (or product-country level). The Chinese
government considers two types of foreign-invested enterprises, fully foreign-owned enterprises and
Sino-foreign equity joint ventures. We consider both of these types of enterprises as "foreign
owned".27 Results remain robust when we consider only fully foreign owned enterprises.
Our key independent variables are various measures of headquarter intensity. Following the
existing empirical literature on the determinants of intra-rm trade, such as Antràs (2003), Yeaple
24We purchased these data from Mr. George Shen from China Customs Statistics Information Center, Economic
Information Agency, Hong Kong.
25Example of a product: 611241 - Womens or girlsswimwear of synthetic bres, knitted or crocheted.
26The data also report quantity, quantity units, customs o¢ ces (ports) where the transaction was processed (97 in
total), and transportation modes.
27According to the Chinese law a rm is considered foreign owned if a foreign partner has no less than 25% of
ownership stake. In the U.S. Census Bureau data, U.S imports are classied as "related-party" if either rm owns,
controls or holds voting power equivalent to 6% of the shares or voting stock of the other organization. Existing
studies that have used U.S. Census Bureau data to investigate the determinants of intra-rm trade use "related-party"
imports to measure intra-rm trade.
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(2006), Bernard et al. (2008) and Nunn and Treer (2008, 2011), we use skill and physical capital
intensities as our proxies for the importance of headquarter services in production. The measures
of industry factor intensity are constructed using data from Bartelsman and Gray (1996), averaged
across the period 2001-2005.28 For each 4-digit SIC industry we construct the measure of skill-
intensity, ln(Hj=Lj); as the log of non-production worker wages divided by total worker wages.
Physical capital intensity (total capital, ln(Kj=Lj), and the break down into capital-equipment
intensity, ln(Ej=Lj), and capital-plant intensity, ln(Pj=Lj)) are measured as the natural log of the
corresponding capital expenditures divided by total wages.
We also include R&D intensity as an additional proxy for headquarters inputs. We measure
R&D intensity, ln(RDj=Qj), by the natural log of global R&D expenditures divided by rm sales
in each industry. The data are from the Orbis database, constructed by Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing, for the most recent year for which rm level data on R&D are available (either 2006
or 2007). A total of 370,691 plants reported positive R&D expenditure. Since we are interested in
studying the decisions of integration by multinational rms in the two trade regimes under which
the control rights of components are allocated to di¤erent parties, we use material intensity as a
proxy for the importance of components in production. Material intensity, ln(Mj=Lj), is the log of
the cost of materials divided by total wages.
We use U.S. factor intensities of production, assuming that they are correlated with the corre-
sponding factor intensities in other countries, following existing literature. To check the robustness
of our results, we also construct measures of physical capital, skill, and R&D and advertisement
intensity using plant-level data from the Chinese National Bureau of StatisticsCensus of Industrial
Firms for 2005. Restricted by data availability, the denitions of these factor intensity measures
are di¤erent from the US-based benchmark measures. Capital intensity is dened as the log ratio
of the real value of capital to the real value of output in each sector. Human capital is the log of the
share of high-school graduates in the workforce of each sector.29 R&D intensity is the log average
ratio of R&D expenditure to value-added across rms in each sector. Advertisement intensity is
measured by the log average ratio of advertisement expenditure to value-added across rms in each
sector.
We follow Helpman et al. (2004) and construct the measure of productivity dispersion using
the standard deviation of rm sales across all rms within an industry. The data are from Chinas
Manufacturing Survey for 2005. For robustness we use two alternative measures based on exports.
The rst one is the standard deviation of export revenue across Chinese export processing plants
in each sector, using rm-level exports data for 2005 from Chinas Customs. The second one is
the measure of industry productivity dispersion from Nunn and Treer (2008) for 2005.30 We use
28We are grateful to Randy Becker from the U.S. Bureau of the Census for providing us with an updated version
of the database.
29Our results are robust to using the share of college graduates in each sectors workforce to measure skill intensity.
30Given the lack of rm-level data, Nunn and Treer (2008a) construct sales of "notional" rms using U.S. export
data from the U.S. Department of Commerce. They dene an industry as an HS6 product and the sales of a notional
rm as the exports of an HS10 good exported from U.S. location l to destination country c. Their measure of
productivity dispersion within an industry is the standard deviation of the log of exports of a good from location l
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the US productivity dispersion measure, assuming that decisions on the organizational form of the
production unit are usually made by headquarters in developed countries. We believe that the
US-based measure is a good proxy for productivity dispersion in other developed countries.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section we investigate whether control over the components for assembly a¤ects the decision
to integrate with the assembly plant in vertical production relationships. Namely, we examine the
hypotheses emphasized in prediction 1 that (1) the export share of vertically integrated (VI) export
processing plants is increasing in the sectors headquarter intensity and that (2) the export share
of VI plants under import-assembly is increasing in headquarter intensity of inputs, whereas that
under pure-assembly is decreasing in headquarter intensity. We then investigate whether a higher
sectoral productivity dispersion is associated with a larger export share from integrated plants in
pure-assembly, as postulated in prediction 2.
5.1 Examining the E¤ects of Headquarter Intensity
To investigate the e¤ect of headquarter-intensity of inputs on the prevalence of vertically integrated
exports, we start by examining the rst hypothesis from prediction 1. We estimate the following
cross-industry regression both at the HS 6-digit product level and at the HS 6-digit level to each
importing country to exploit both product and country dimensions of the data: 
XNV +XSVP
l=N;S;k=V;OXlk
!
pjc
= dc + hhj + kkj + mmj + pjc, (9)
where p stands for product, j for industry, and c for country. V and O represent vertical integration
and outsourcing, respectively; and N and S represent pure-assembly and import-assembly, respec-
tively. The dependent variable is the share of processing exports from foreign-owned assembly plants
over total processing exports at the product-country level (or at the product level) in industry j. To
proxy for headquarter intensity, we use the measures of skill intensity hj  ln(Hj=Lj) and physical
capital intensity kj  ln(Kj=Lj) described in the previous section.31 In some specications, we use
R&D intensity rdj  ln(RDj=Qj) as an alternative measure.32
For robustness checks, we follow Nunn and Treer (2011) and include capital-equipment ej 
ln(Ej=Lj) and capital-plant pj  ln(Pj=Lj) in alternative to the overall measure of physical capital
intensity. The former type of capital expenditures are more likely to be more relationship-specic
than the latter, and therefore more relevant for the integration decision. We use material intensity
mj  ln(Mj=Lj) as a proxy for the importance of components in production. We include country
to country c. We are grateful to Nathan Nunn for sending us the data.
31We also use total employment of each sector as the denominator of each measure of factory intensity instead of
total worker wages. Our results are insensitive to the use of these alternative measures.
32Although conceptually R&D intensity is potentially a better measure, there are issues related with data availability
and quality and therefore we use it for robustness checks.
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xed e¤ects dc when observations are at the HS6-country level.33 The error term pjc is assumed
to be uncorrelated with the regressors. Because our regressors of interest vary across SIC 4-digit
industries, the standard errors are always clustered at the SIC 4-digit level to take into account the
correlation between observations within the same SIC category.34
We investigate the hypothesis that exports from vertically integrated plants account for a larger
share of processing exports in more headquarter-intensive sectors. Thus, the predicted signs of h
and k are positive. Table 4 reports results from estimating (9). In columns (1) through (4) an
observation is a HS6 product to each country. These specications therefore take into account
importing country characteristics such as distance from China, quality of judicial institutions and
factor endowments. Since our focus is on the sectoral determinants of the export share of integrated
plants, we control for country xed e¤ects to partial out the e¤ects of countriescharacteristics.
The results conform closely to the theoretical prediction for all the alternative measures of
headquarter intensity of inputs (skill intensity, physical capital intensity, and R&D intensity).
They are evidence of a strong, positive, and statistically signicant correlation between the share
of vertical integration and the intensity of headquarter inputs across sectors. The rst two columns
report OLS results and show standardized beta coe¢ cients, while columns (3) and (4) report Tobit
results.35 The coe¢ cients on skill and capital intensity are positive and statistically signicant at
the 1% level. These results conrm the main ndings by Yeaple (2006), Bernard et al. (2008),
Nunn and Treer (2008, 2011), who nd a positive relationship between skill and capital intensity
and the share of intra-rm trade across U.S. manufacturing industries. The size of the coe¢ cients
is at the same magnitude of those reported by Nunn and Treer (2008) for the U.S. We also nd a
positive and signicant correlation between the share of vertical integrated exports and the sectors
R&D intensity (columns (2) and (4)).36
As discussed in Antràs (2011) and Nunn and Treer (2011), standard measures of physical cap-
ital include certain types of investments that are easily contractible and thus are not relationship-
specic. According to the property-rights theory of multinational rm boundaries, it is then ex-
pected that investments in specialized equipment are more relationship-specic, and thus more
relevant for the decision of whether to integrate, while structures or plants can be used to produce
other goods and are therefore associated with a higher outside value.
To investigate these issues, in alternative specications we include capital-equipment and capital-
plant intensity separately in the regressions. We report results for these specications in appendix
Table A4. The coe¢ cients on skill and R&D intensity remain positive and highly signicant.
Capital-equipment, is also strongly, positively and signicantly correlated with the share of verti-
cally integrated processing exports. Whereas the coe¢ cients on the intensity of capital-plant are
negative and statistically signicant. This is consistent with the ndings by Antràs (2011), Antràs
33When the analysis is performed at the HS6 product level the subscript c would be omitted form equation 9 and
instead of country xed-e¤ects we include a constant term.
34The mapping of HS 6-digit categories to SIC 4-digit industries is discussed in detail in the appendix.
35Since the vertical integrated export share dependent variables are limited between values of 0 and 1, we also
report results from Tobit methods. Results are consistent with the OLS ones.
36R&D intensity and skill intensity are highly correlated and therefore are not included as regressors simultaneously.
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and Chor (2011), and Nunn and Treer (2011).
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 4 report results at the HS 6-digit product level. Skill and cap-
ital intensities remain positively and signicantly correlated with the share of vertically integrated
export processing exports across sectors. The coe¢ cients on R&D intensity remain positive but
they are not signicant. However, when we take into account the di¤erent degree of relationship
specicity of di¤erent types of capital, the coe¢ cients on R&D remain positive and statistically
signicant (see Table A4 in appendix).
We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between headquarter-intensity of inputs and
the prevalence of vertically integrated exports in each regime of export processing. We investigate
the second hypothesis emphasized in Prediction 1 that the export share of integrated plants under
import-assembly is increasing in headquarter intensity, whereas that under pure-assembly is de-
creasing. We estimate the following cross-industry regression at both HS6 and HS6-country levels
of observation:  
XlVP
l=N;S;k=V;OXlk
!
pjc
= dc + hhj + kkj + mmj + pjc, (10)
l is the trade regime type that can be S (import-assembly) orN (pure-assembly). The dependent
variable is the share of integrated assembly plantsexports of a HS6-digit product or HS6-country
pair in industry j under trade regime l over total processing exports. All other variables are as
dened before. According to Prediction 1, the expected signs of h and k are positive for import-
assembly and negative for pure-assembly.
Table 5 reports results from estimating equation (10) for both trade regimes at the HS6 level.
In columns (1) through (4) we report results for the import-assembly regime. The results conrm
the theoretical prediction for all proxies of headquarter intensity (skill, physical capital and R&D).
They show that when the assembly plants retain control over the component choice, the export
share of vertically integrated plants is positively correlated with headquarter intensity of inputs
across sectors. The coe¢ cients on skill intensity and R&D intensity are positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level. Similarly, we obtain a strong, positive and statistically signicant
correlation between capital intensity and the share of vertical integration.
Material intensity is found to be negatively correlated with the integrated plantsexport share
in the import-assembly regime. Insights from the property-rights approach can help us explain the
relationship. Under import-assembly, the control rights over the input decision are allocated to
the assembly plant. Since integration e¤ectively grants a bigger share of expected revenue to the
headquarter, it weakens the plants incentive to invest in input-purchase activities. The distortion
e¤ects are bigger in more material-intensive sectors, making integration a less preferred organization
mode.
The results for pure-assembly are reported in columns (5) to (8). We nd no evidence of
a positive correlation between the measures of headquarter intensity of inputs and the share of
integrated plantsexports for this regime. The coe¢ cients on the headquarter intensity measures are
generally negative and statistically signicant (with the exception of skill intensity which is negative
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but insignicant). In sum, the results reported in Table 5 are consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model as skill, R&D and physical capital are all positively and signicantly correlated
with the share of exports from vertically integrated plants in the import-assembly regime. The
negative relationship for the pure-assembly regime arises because when the gains from integration
are smaller for the headquarter rm without input controls (import-assembly) than with it (pure-
assembly), the volume of exports from import-assembly expand more than that from pure-assembly,
causing a decline in the share of exports in the pure-assembly regime in total processing exports.
Since we have used export shares of a product aggregated across importing countries, the above
results do not take into account importing country characteristics. To take this into account, we
also perform the analysis using unilateral export value in a HS 6-digit product category to each
importing country as the unit of observation. Table 6 reports results which are consistent with
those reported in Table 5. In particular, for the import-assembly regime (columns (1) to (4)), we
continue to nd a positive and statistically signicant relationship (at the 1% level) between the
share of integrated plantsexports and all measures of intensity of headquarter inputs (skill, R&D
and capital).37 For pure-assembly (columns (5) to (8)), we continue to nd evidence of a negative
correlation between headquarter intensity of inputs and vertical integration.
So far, we have examined exports from China to the rest of the world, regardless of whether
the importing countries are developed or not. To obtain a set of empirical results mapping the
predictions of a North-South trade model, we also focus on Chinese exports to developed countries.
We conduct regression analyses over groups of countries at di¤erent levels of development (low-
income countries, high-income countries, and a few selected countries). The results from OLS are
reported in Table 7.38 Columns (1) through (6) show results for import-assembly, while those
for pure-assembly are reported in columns (7) to (12). Results are largely consistent with those
reported in Table 5 for the full sample of countries.
To address the concern that the US-based factor intensity measures may not reect the intrinsic
properties of production, and are specic to the U.S., we focus on Chinese exports to the U.S. only
in column (3). The results are quantitatively similar to those for the full sample reported in Table
5, in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical signicance. Columns (4) and (5) report consistent
results using the samples of exports to Japan and to high-income European countries, respectively.
In column (6) we exclude exports to Hong Kong from the sample to address the concern that
some foreign-owned plants may have their headquarters in Hong Kong, who serve as intermediaries
to re-export nal products to foreign clients. The results are consistent with those when the full
sample of countries is used, in sign, statistical signicance and magnitude.
In sum, the results reported in this section show that while for the import-assembly regime the
37Results are robust to including capital-equipment and capital-plant instead of the overall measure of physi-
cal capital. We obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the intensity of equipment, the more
relationship-specic type of capital, and a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on plant intensity, the type
of capital that is less relationship-specic (see Table A5 in the appendix ).
38Results are robust to using Tobit methods, and to including the measures of equipment-capital and plant-capital
separately in alternative to the overall measure of physical capital. Results remain robust when we include R&D
intensity as an alternative proxy for headquarter intensity.
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share of vertical integration is positively and signicantly correlated with the intensity of inputs
provided by the headquarter, for the pure-assembly regime there is no evidence of a positive rela-
tionship. These results are consistent with our theoretical Prediction 1, which predicts that if the
benet to integrate is signicantly larger for the headquarter when she does not control any imported
inputs (import-assembly) than when she does (pure-assembly), the share of vertically-integrated
exports under import-assembly is increasing in the sectors headquarter intensity, whereas that
under pure-assembly is decreasing.
5.2 Examining the E¤ects of Productivity Dispersion
This section investigates the e¤ect of productivity dispersion, and its interactive e¤ects with head-
quarter intensity, on the prevalence of integrated plants exports across industries. It is now a
well-known fact that rm productivity di¤ers widely within an industry, and exhibits a at-tail
distribution.39 Our model predicts that when the distribution of rm productivity becomes more
dispersed (i.e., more clustered on the right tail), the share of integrated plants exports under
pure-assembly increases while the relationship is ambiguous in the import-assembly regime.40
We follow Helpman et. al (2004) and use the standard deviation of the log of rm sales across
rms within an industry

j

as the empirical counterpart of productivity dispersion. We estimate
the following equation: 
XlVP
l=N;S;k=V;OXlk
!
pjc
= dc +
 
 + j
 j + h j + pjc (11)
where l is the regime type (import-assembly or pure assembly) and  j contains the headquarter
intensity measures dened above. j is one of the measures of headquarter intensity (skill, capital
or R&D). We control for importer heterogeneity by including country xed e¤ects, dc. The model
predicts that the most productive rms engage in integration under pure-assembly in headquarter-
intensive sectors. Thus, we expect  > 0 and  > 0 for the pure-assembly regime.
Using the product-country sample, we report the estimates of equation (11) in Table 8. We
include all stand-alone headquarter intensity measures as controls, and cluster standard errors at the
SIC 4-digit level. Columns (1) to (3) report results for the pure-assembly regime. The coe¢ cients
on both the stand-alone productivity dispersion term j and productivity dispersion interacted with
headquarter intensity j  j are positive and statistically signicant at 1% level, for all proxies of
headquarter inputs, j , used. This suggests that the export share of integrated plants increases in
productivity dispersion in sectors with higher headquarter intensity. For import-assembly, we do
not nd evidence of a positive relationship between sectoral productivity dispersion and the share
of integrated plantsexports (columns (4) to (6)). These results provide support for prediction 2.
39According to Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2009), the top 1 (10) percent of the U.S. trading rms
accounted for 81 (96) percent of U.S. trade in 2000.
40The ambiguity arises because both organization modes could lose market share when the distribution of rm
productivity is more dispersed.
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For robustness checks, we also use exports-based measures of productivity dispersion, following
Nunn and Treer (2008). Results are reported in Table 9. In the top panel, the measure of
productivity dispersion used is the standard deviation of the log of export revenue of Chinese
export processing plants in each sector in 2005. The results are largely consistent with those from
Table 8. All dispersion and interaction terms are positive and statistically signicant for pure-
assembly, while they are insignicant for import-assembly. We obtain similar results when using
the U.S. export-based measure of productivity dispersion from Nunn and Treer (2008), with the
exception that when skill is used to proxy for j the coe¢ cients in column (1) become insignicant
(bottom panel of Table 9). All the results in this section are robust to using a sample at the HS
6-digit product level.
5.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present robustness tests for the baseline results from section 5.1. The factor
intensity measures we used previously are constructed from U.S. data, which is based on the
assumption that the ranking of these measures is stable across countries. Although this approach
has been widely adopted in previous empirical studies,41 to check the robustness of our results we
also use factor intensity and R&D intensity measures constructed using Chinese rm-level data.
The Chinese measures are described in section 4. Table 10 reports results at the HS6-county level.
We obtain a positive and statistically signicant relationship between skill intensity, R&D and
advertisement intensity, and the share of integrated plantsexports under import-assembly (columns
(1) through (5)). The results are independent of using samples at the product or country-product
level.
The coe¢ cient on capital intensity is statistically insignicant. As discussed above, the overall
physical capital measure includes investments that are easily contractible and therefore not relevant
for the integration decision. However, the Chinese data does not allow us to construct measures to
include contractible and non-contractible investments in capital separately in the regressions. For
pure-assembly, we nd evidence of a negative relationship between the measures of headquarter
intensity and the share of vertically integrated exports (columns (6) through (10)). These ndings
are largely consistent with the results obtained when we use US-based measures of factor intensity.
The vertical integration export shares are limited between the values zero and one. Table
A1 shows that there are a number of observations that cluster around the two endpoints. It is
expected that in thinner markers there will be more clustering around zero and one. For example,
in the extreme situation where there is only one rm in a HS 6-digit category, the rm will either
vertically integrate with the plant or o¤shore. To take this into account, as a further robustness
check we limit the estimation sample to larger HS6 sectors which are more likely to be populated
by a large number of rms with di¤erent productivity levels that chose to organize production
41The approach of using sector measures constructed using U.S. data originates from Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Subsequent empirical studies on countries comparative advantage have adopted the same approach. See Romalis
(2003), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Manova (2007), among others.
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in di¤erent modes. We estimate equation (10) restricting the sample to larger HS6 categories by
export value by dropping the bottom 3 deciles.42 Table 11 reports results. The results are robust
whether using samples at the product or product-country level. We continue to nd that the
share of vertical integrated exports is positively and signicantly correlated with all measures of
headquarters intensity of inputs for import-assembly. The coe¢ cients are also of similar magnitude
to those reported in Table 6. For pure-assembly, we nd no evidence of a positive correlation
between headquarter intensity and vertical integration.
As a further robustness check, instead of running separate regressions for the import-assembly
and pure-assembly regimes we pool the data across the two regimes and run a regression on the
full sample including dummies for import-assembly. Results from OLS are reported in Table 12.43
Columns (1) through (4) report results at the HS6 level while columns (5) through (8) report those
for the HS6-country level. We include the measures of headquarter intensity as well as interaction
terms between the headquarter intensity proxies and a dummy variable which takes the value of one
for the import-assembly regime. The table reports regular, unstandardized coe¢ cients, for direct
comparison with those that result from running separate regressions for each regime.
The coe¢ cients on the stand-alone headquarter intensity measures correspond to those for the
pure-assembly regime.44 They remain statistically insignicant or negative and signicant. The
coe¢ cients on the interaction between headquarter intensity and the dummy for import-assembly
correspond to the di¤erence in the headquarter intensity coe¢ cients between the two regimes. The
results show that the di¤erence is positive and statistically signicant for all proxies of headquarter
intensity. We therefore conrm the nding of a positive and signicant correlation between the
share of vertically integrated exports and all measures of headquarters intensity for the import-
assembly regime but not for pure-assembly. Results show that the coe¢ cients are statistically
di¤erent between the two regimes. In sum, the results reported in this section conrm the ndings
from the baseline specications reported in the previous sections.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses detailed product-level export data for China to investigate the determinants of
foreign integration versus outsourcing. We exploit the coexistence of two regulatory trade regimes
for export processing in China, pure-assembly and import-assembly, which let us observe the al-
location of ownership and control rights over imported components in a multinational production
relationship. Under import-assembly, Chinese plants make the decision of which components to
purchase and have control rights over their use. Under pure-assembly, ownership and control over
42We also performed similar exercises dropping the lowest 10%, 20% or 40% of HS6 sectors by export value, and
obtained quantitatively similar results in sign, magnitude and statistical signicance.
43Results are robust to using Tobit methods.
44Note that in table 12 we report regular coe¢ cients while in tables 5 and 6 we report standardized beta coef-
cients. The coe¢ cients on the stand alone headquarter intensity measures reported in table 12 are identical to
the unstandardized coe¢ cients corresponding to the results from tables 5 and 6, for the pure-assembly regime. The
unstandardized coe¢ cients from the separate regression for import-and-assembly are identical to the sum of the
coe¢ cients on the stand-alone headquarter measures and the interaction terms reported in table 12.
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the components shipped to China remains with the nal-good producer. To examine how choices
of organizational structure are a¤ected by the allocation of control rights over the imported inputs
in export processing, we present an extension of the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model to consider
investments in input purchasing.
By considering two ownership structures under two trade regimes, our model predicts that if
the benet to integrate is signicantly larger for the headquarter when she does not control any
imported inputs (import-assembly) than when she does (pure-assembly), the share of vertically-
integrated exports under import-assembly is increasing in the sectors headquarter intensity, consis-
tent with the main prediction in Antràs (2003); whereas that under pure-assembly is decreasing. In
a headquarter-intensive sector where safeguarding the headquarters investment incentives is impor-
tant, a foreign client can choose to either own and control imported inputs or own the plants assets
to alleviate hold-up. The export volume from integrated plants increases for both import-assembly
and pure-assembly. If the export volume increases more for the former, the share of integrated
plants under pure-assembly in total processing trade decreases.
Our empirical results show that when the control rights over the input-purchase decisions are
allocated to the Chinese assembly plant, the export share of integrated plants is increasing in the
intensity of headquarter inputs across sectors. These results are consistent with existing theories
on intra-rm trade. However, if Chinese plants engage in pure-assembly (i.e., the foreign rm has
ownership and control over the components shipped to China), we nd no evidence of a positive
correlation between the prevalence of vertical integration and the intensity of headquarter inputs,
consistent with our model predictions. These results imply that control over components for as-
sembly can be used as an alternative to asset ownership to mitigate hold-up by foreign suppliers
when o¤shoring assembly tasks.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction about the sorting of rms into di¤erent production
modes, we nd that the export share of integrated plants in pure-assembly increases in productivity
dispersion in sectors with higher headquarter intensity. For import-assembly, we do not nd evi-
dence of a positive relationship between sectoral productivity dispersion and the share of integrated
plantsexports.
25
7 References
1. Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997), Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,Journal of
Political Economy, 105(1), 1-29.
2. Amiti, M. and Smarzynska Javorcik, B. (2008) Trade costs and location of foreign rms in
China," Journal of Development Economics, 85(1-2), 129-149.
3. Antràs, P. (2003), Firms, Contracts and Trade Structure,Quarterly Journal of Economics,
118(4), 1375-1418.
4. Antràs, P. (2005), Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle,American Economic Re-
view, 95(4), 10541073.
5. Antràs, P. (2011), Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property
Rights, and the International Organization of Production,Mimeo Harvard University.
6. Antràs, P. and E. Helpman (2004), Global Sourcing,Journal of Political Economy, 112(3),
552-580.
7. Antràs, P. and E. Helpman (2008), Contractual Frictions and Global Sourcing,in E. Help-
man, D. Martin and T. Verdier eds., The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy, Harvard
University Press.
8. Antràs, P. and D. Chor (2011), Organizing the Global Value Chain,Mimeo Harvard Uni-
versity.
9. Bartelsman, E. J. and W. Gray (1996) The NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database,
Technical Working Paper No. 205, National Bureau of Economic Research.
10. Bergin, P., R. Feenstra, and G. Hanson (2009), O¤shoring and Volatility: Evidence from
Mexicos Maquiladora Industry,American Economic Review, 99(4), 166471.
11. Bergin, P., R. Feenstra, and G. Hanson (2011), "Volatility due to O¤shoring: Theory and
Evidence," Journal of International Economics, 85(2), 163-338.
12. Bernard, A., J. Jensen and P. Schott (2009), Importers, Exporters and Multinationals: A
Portrait of Firms in the U.S. that Trade Goods, in Dunne, T. and J.B. Jensen and M.J.
Roberts eds., Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from Micro Data, University Of Chicago
Press.
13. Bernard, A., J. Jensen, S. Redding and P. Schott (2007a), Firms in International Trade,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), 105130.
14. Bernard, A., J. Jensen, S. Redding and P. Schott (2008), intra-rm Trade and Product
Contractibility,Mimeo, Yale School of Management.
26
15. Conconi, P., P. Legros and A. F. Newman, (2008), Trade Liberalization and Organizational
Change,CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7028.
16. Corcos, G., D. Irac, G. Mion and T. Verdier (2008), The Determinants of Intra-Firm Trade,
Centro Studi Luca DAgliano Working Paper No. 267.
17. Defever, F. and F. Toubal (2007), Productivity and the Sourcing Modes of Multinational
Firms: Evidence from French Firm-Level Data,CEP Discussion Paper No. 842.
18. Feenstra R. and G. Hanson (2005), Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Es-
timating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm,Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2),
729-761.
19. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2002), Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilib-
rium,Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 85-120.
20. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2003), Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium,
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3), 317327.
21. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2004), Managerial Incentives and the International Organi-
zation of Production,Journal of International Economics, 63, 237262.
22. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2005), Outsourcing in a Global Economy,Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 72(1), 135159.
23. Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986), The Costs and Benets of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration,Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691-719.
24. Head, K. and T. Mayer (2004), Market potential and the location of Japanese investment
in the European Union," Review of Economics and Statistics 86(4), 959972.
25. Helpman, E. (2006), Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms, Journal of Economic
Literature, 44, 589-630.
26. Helpman, E., M. Melitz, and S. Yeaple (2004) Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms,
American Economic Review, 94(1), 300316.
27. Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1994), The Firm as an Incentive System,American Eco-
nomic Review, 84(4), 972991.
28. Hummels D., J. Ishii and K. Yi (2001), The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization
in World Trade,Journal of International Economics, 54(1), 75-96.
29. International Labour Organization, (2007) Export Processing Zones: Epz Employment Statis-
tics. Available from http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/epz/stats.htm.
27
30. Kohler W. and M. Smolka (2009), Global Sourcing Decisions and Firm Productivity: Evi-
dence from Spain,CESifo Working Paper No. 2903.
31. Levchenko, A. (2007), Institutional Quality and International Trade,Review of Economic
Studies, 74(3), 791-819.
32. Manova, K. (2007), Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms and International Trade,
Mimeo, Stanford University.
33. Marin D. and T. Verdier (2008), Power Inside The Firm and The Market: A General Equi-
librium Approach,Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(4), 752-788.
34. Marin D. and T. Verdier (2009), Power in the Multinational Corporation in Industry Equi-
librium," Economic Theory, 38(3), 437-464.
35. McLaren, J., (2000), Globalization and Vertical Structure,American Economic Review,
90(5), 1239-1254.
36. Melitz, M. (2003) The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry
productivity," Econometrica, 71(6), 16951725.
37. Naughton, B. (1996), Chinas Emergence and Prospects as a Trading Nation,Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 1996, 273-343.
38. Nunn, N. (2007), Relationship-Specicity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 569-600.
39. Nunn, N. and D. Treer (2008), The Boundaries of the Multinational Firm: An Empirical
Analysis, in E. Helpman, D. Martin and T. Verdier eds., The Organization of Firms in a
Global Economy, Harvard University Press.
40. Nunn, N. and D. Treer (2011), Incomplete Contracts and the Boundaries of the Multina-
tional Firm,Mimeo, Harvard University.
41. Ornelas, E. and J. Turner (2009), Protection and International Sourcing,Mimeo, LSE.
42. Puga D. and D. Treer (2003) Knowledge Creation and Control in Organizations," NBER
Working Paper No. 9121.
43. Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1998), Financial Dependence and Growth,American Economic
Review, 88(3), 559-586.
44. Rauch, J. (1999), Networks versus Markets in International Trade,Journal of International
Economics, 48(1),735.
45. Romalis, J. (2003), Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade,American
Economic Review , 94(1), 67-97.
28
46. Sheng and Yang (2011), "Processing Trade, Ownership Structure, and Wage Inequality: The-
ory and Evidence from China," mimeo, University of California, Davis.
47. Yeaple, S. (2006), O¤shoring, Foreign Direct Investment, and the Structure of U.S. Trade,
Journal of the European Economic Association 4(2-3), 602611.
29
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Model
Pure-Assembly (the N mode) Recall from the main text that under pure-assembly (the N
mode), the ex-post revenue-sharing rules imply NV = 
+  (1  ) > NO = . In this regime,
H maximizes her expected operating prots anticipating ex post payo¤s as follows:
max
m;h
fNkR (m;a; h)  wNNm  wNhg :
As maximization problem is
max
a
f(1  Nk)R (m;a; h)  wSag .
For organizational form k 2 fV;Og, solving Hs and As problems simultaneously gives the
prot-maximizing levels a, h and m in terms of wS , wS , , , D, s and importantly, Nk.45
Plugging a, h, and m into the production units revenue function (equation (3)), we solve for
rm revenue associated with organization mode k under pure-assembly as RNk = D'Nk, where
   1  and
'Nk =
"
(N )
m


wS
1  Nk
a  wN
Nk
h+m#  1 
;
and the operating prot becomes Nk = D Nk wNfNk; where fNk is the xed cost of production
and
 Nk = 'Nk
n
1  
h
Nk
m + Nk
h + (1  Nk) a
io
.
The function  Nk reaches its maximum when
d Nk
dNk
= 0. Solving this equation yields
N (
a) =
(1  a) (1  a) pa (1  a) (1  a) (1   (1  a))
1  2a :
Notice 0N (a) < 0. Given that a = 1  
 
h + m

, 0N
 
h + m

> 0. These comparative
statics will ultimately determine the optimal production mode.
A.1.1 Import-Assembly
Recall from the main text that under import-assembly (the S mode), the ex-post revenue-sharing
rules imply SV =  (1  )+ (1  )  > SO =  (1  ). Notice that NV > SV > SO. If we
further assume that asset ownership is su¢ ciently more e¤ective in alleviating the hold-up by A,
that is,  (1  ) > , we have SV =  (1  ) + (1  )  >  = NO.
Anticipating ex-post bargaining as investments are non-contractible, H maximizes her expected
operating prots as:
max
h
fSkR (m;a; h)  wNhg :
45m = m
"
Nk
1 Nk
a (wS)a (wN )h (N )m
NkD
1 
# 1
 1
;wSa = 
a(1 Nk)
Nk
"
Nk
1 Nk
a (wS)a (wN )h (N )m
NkD
1 
# 1
 1
;wNh =
h
"
Nk
1 Nk
a (wS)a (wN )h (N )m
NkD
1 
# 1
 1
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As maximization problem is
max
a;m
f(1  Sk)R (m;a; h)  wSSm  wSag
For organizational form k 2 fV;Og, solving Hs and As problems simultaneously gives the
prot-maximizing investment levels a, h and m in terms of wS , wN , , , D, s and importantly,
Sk.
46 Plugging a, h and m into the joint production units revenue (equation (3)), we obtain
revenue for organization mode k under pure-assembly as RNk = D'Sk, where   

1  and
'Sk =
"
(S)
m


wS
1  Sk
1 h wN
Sk
h#  1 
:
The joint production units operating prot (which is Hs objective when choosing the optimal
production mode as we will see below) can be expressed as Sk =  SkD wNfSk, where   

1 
and
 Sk = 'Sk
n
1  
h
Sk
h + (1  Sk)

1  h
io
.
The function  Sk reaches its maximum when
d Sk
dSk
= 0, implying
S

h

=
h
 
1    1  h ph (1  h) (1  h) (1   (1  h))
2h   1 :
Notice that 0S
 
h

> 0, which is an essential property for determining the ex ante optimal
production mode.
A.1.2 Choosing Optimal Production Modes
The coexistence of all four production modes, as illustrated in gure 1, requires a specic ranking of
 0lks. The ranking of  
0
lks ultimately depends on 
0
Sks and the input prices: wN , wS , N , and S .
On the one hand, for a given organizational mode (k), giving Hs control over imported components
under pure assembly gives her more incentives to invest in headquarter activities compared with
import-assembly (i.e.,  Sk <  Nk). On the other hand, lower wS can make As procurement of
components and thus import-assembly more attractive than pure-assembly for H. Formally, for
a given component intensity m, outsourcing under pure-assembly would be more protable than
integration under import-assembly (i.e.,  NO >  SV ) if and only if
N
S
m
 
 
NO; 
h

 (SV ; 
h)
, (12)
where 
 
; h

=

1    h + m + (1  )  1  h   m 1  h+m (1  )1 h m and   ; h =
1    h + (1  )  1  h 1  (1  )1 h h .47 The higher the marginal costs of component
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search in the North relative to the South, the more likely inequality (12) will hold.48 As such, we
have the following ranking of protability (the slopes of lk):
 NV >  NO >  SV >  SO:
Proof of Lemma For organization mode k,
d

ln
 Nk
 Sk

dh
 0:
Proof:
Notice that
d

ln
 Nk
 Sk

dh
= 1  ln

1 Sk
1 Nk
Nk
Sk

+

(2Sk 1)

Sk(a;h)
  (2Nk 1)

Nk(a;h)

where 
Sk
 
a; h

=
1  Skh + (1  Sk)  1  h and 
Nk  a; h = 1  Nk  m + h+ (1  Nk)  1  h   m.49
Consider h = 1 (i.e., a = m = 0) for the moment.
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. Given that
(1  Sk) (1  )Sk < (1  Sk)2, we know that dd
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> 0. Since when  = 0,  Nk =  Sk
and
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
dh
= 0 for k = fO; V g, we can show that d
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 Nk
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
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> 0 8 2 [0; 1].
Let us know consider h < 1. Notice that
d
Sk(a;h)
dh
=   (2Sk   1) >
d
Nk(a;h)
dh
=
  (2Nk   1), togehter with Nk > Sk, we can show that
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2 < 0. Since
d

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
dh
> 0
when h = 1,
d

ln
 Nk
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
dh
 0 8h 2 [0; 1].
Similarly, we can show that
d

ln
 lV
 lO

dh
 0 for trade regime l; and since we assume that asset
ownership is more e¤ective in alleviating hold-up compared to input control (i.e., SV > NO), we
can show that
d

ln
 NO
 SV

dh
 0.
The export share of integrated import-assembly processing plants in total processing exports is
sSV =
XSVP
l=V;O;k=N;S Xlk
=

XSO
XSV
+
XNO
XSV
+
XNV
XSV
+ 1
 1
;
where XSOXSV =
'SO
'SV

SV
SO
 1   1 1  SVNO 1
 1
; XNOXSV =
'NO
'SV

1 

NO
NV
 1 
NO
SV
 1   1 1;
and XNVXSV =
'NV
'SV

NV
SV
 1   NVNO  1
 1
. Simple comparative statics show that both XSOXSV and
XNO
XSV
are decreasing in h. The impact of an increase of h on XNVXSV is ambiguous since
'NV
'SV
is in-
creasing in h, but NVNO is increasing in 
h whereas NVSV can be increasing or decreasing in 
h.
As such, the relation between h and XSVP
l=V;O;k=N;S Xlk
is ambiguous. See Figure 2 for a graphical
exposition.
48Notice that both  and  are non-monotonic in  for low value of h. In particular, in an assembly-intensive
sector (i.e., when h is small),  cuts  from above at  > 1=2, after which both  and  are decreasing in .
49 
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The export share of integrated pure-assembly plants in total processing exports is
sNV =
XNVP
l=V;O;k=N;S Xlk
=

XSO
XNV
+
XNO
XNV
+
XSV
XNV
+ 1
 1
;
where XSOXNV =
'SO
'NV

NV
SO
 1 
1 

SO
SV
 1
; XNOXNV =
'NO
'NV

NV
NO
 1   1;
and XSVXNV =
'SV
'NV

NV
SV
 1   NVNO  1

. Simple comparative statics show that both XSOXNV
and XNOXNV are decreasing in 
h. As is discussed above, the impact of an increase of h on XNVXSV is
ambiguous, implying that the relation between h and XNVP
l=V;O;k=N;S Xlk
is also ambiguous.
Despite the ambiguous results, the share of total integrated exports (sSV + sNV ) is increasing
in h since XSOXSV ,
XNO
XSV
, XSOXNV , and
XNO
XNV
are all decreasing in h. This result implies that either sSV ,
sNV , or both need to be increasing in h. Of note, the ratio
XSV
XNV
, which appears in both (7) and (8),
plays a key role in determining the relation between h, sNV , and sSV . Specically, if
d

XSV
XNV

dh
>
 d

XSO
XNV
+
XNO
XNV

dh
> 0, dsSV
dh
> 0 but dsNV
dh
< 0.50 Recall that XSVXNV =
'SV
'NV

NV
SV
 1   NVNO  1

.
Figure 2 shows that the productivity cuto¤sNV andSV are both decreasing in h. Figuratively, a
su¢ ciently high
d

XSV
XNV

dh
requiresNV declines su¢ ciently less thanSV (i.e.,
d

NV
SV

dh
is su¢ ciently
positive). Formally, a su¢ ciently high
d ln
NV
SV
dh
require that
d

 SV
 SO

dh
>>

 SV
 SO
  1


 NV
 NO
  1
 d

 NV
 NO

dh
+

 SV
 NO
   SO
 NO
 d NO SO 
dh
> 0: (13)
If inequality (13) holds with a wide margin, the integrated export share under import-assembly
would increase with h, whereas that under pure-assembly would decrease. The required inequality
is more likely to satisfy if integration is associated with a substantially smaller increase in protabil-
ity with controls over inputs rather than without (i.e., a high
d

 SV
 SO

dh
). Consistently, if  SV = SO
to 1, compared to  NV = NO (i.e., integration does not buy H that much benet if inputs are
controlled by A), the required inequality is also more likely to hold. These results are summarized
in Prediction 1.
Proof of Prediction 2 Let us denote the variance of  by V = 2min (  1) 2 (  2) 1. It
can be shown that dVd < 0.
Using (8), and that NVSO >
NV
SV
> NVNO > 1 and
SV
SO
> 1, it can be shown that dsNVd < 0 (i.e.,
sNV is increasing with the variance of ).
Using (7), the sign of dsSVd is generally indeterminate.
A.2 Data Appendix
The concordance le for mapping SIC87 (4-digit) codes to HS-6 digit codes is taken from Peter
Schotts website. We use the new concordance of 1989-2008 US HS codes to US SIC, SITC and
50Notice that
d

XSV
XNV

dh
> 0 implies that
d

XNV
XSV

dh
< 0 and thus sSV is increasing in h unambiguously.
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NAICS codes over time, based on exports.51 When more than one SIC code is identied for a
HS6 code (it happens for 371 HS6 codes out of 5203 in manufacturing industries), the SIC code
that covers the most HS8 categories within the HS6 code is used. For some cases, a HS6 code has
multiple SIC codes tied in the number of HS8 categories shared (it happens for 208 cases). In those
situations, we choose the SIC category that has the highest number of HS6 categories under it as
the unique map.
51http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm
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Table 1: Export Shares Across Trade Regimes (2005)
All Ownership Types
Total Processing Trade Pure-assembly Import-assembly
billion USD 731.27 416.48 83.90 332.60
Share of total exports 100.00% 56.93% 11.47% 45.48%
Foreign-invested Enterprises
billion USD 432.91 346.62 43.65 302.97
Share of total exports 100% 80.07% 10.08% 69.98%
Source: Authorscalculations based on Chinese export data from the Customs General Administration of the Peoples
Republic of China
Table 2: Export Shares of the 4 Ownership-Trade-Regime Production Modes (2005)
Organizational Forms
Integration (V ) Outsourcing (O)
Input Control Pure-assembly (N) 9.67% 12.22% 21.89%
Import-assembly (S) 59.71% 18.40% 78.11%
69.38% 30.62% 100%
Source: Authorscalculations based on Chinese export data from the Customs General Administration of the Peoples
Republic of China
Table 3: Export Bargaining Shares of Revenue of the 4 Ownership-Regime Production Modes
Organizational Forms
lk Integration (V ) Outsourcing (O)
Input Control Pure-assembly (N)  +  (1  ) 
Import-assembly (S)  +  (1     )  (1  )
Table 4: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants
HS6-Country HS6
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.095*** 0.253*** 0.073** 0.081*
(3.471) (3.032) (2.148) (1.956)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) 0.088*** 0.064** 0.168*** 0.134*** 0.073* 0.070* 0.057** 0.056**
(3.380) (2.341) (4.101) (3.084) (1.959) (1.760) (2.371) (2.055)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.071*** 0.048** 0.039 0.012
(2.613) (2.469) (1.241) (1.150)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.205*** -0.208*** -0.115*** -0.127*** -0.074*** -0.082***
(-3.474) (-3.377) (-4.028) (-4.033) (-2.984) (-3.336) (-2.756) (-3.034)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes no no no no
N 80474 77181 80474 77181 3664 3541 3664 3541
No. Clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .035 .031 .017 .016 .016 .013 .0085 .0071
N left-censored 14899 14358 319 314
N right-censored 33454 32285 570 560
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsExport Processing exports as a share of total Export Processing
exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country in columns (1) to (4) and a 6-digit HS product
category in columns (5) to (8). Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (HS6 level)
Trade Regime: Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.082*** 0.107*** -0.022 -0.011
(2.621) (2.702) (-0.542) (-0.230)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) 0.148*** 0.108** 0.095*** 0.072** -0.136** -0.072 -0.109*** -0.072**
(2.836) (2.014) (2.796) (1.961) (-1.970) (-1.043) (-3.165) (-2.033)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.112*** 0.036*** -0.131*** -0.036***
(3.293) (3.106) (-3.500) (-3.652)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.115*** -0.099** -0.074** -0.065** 0.009 -0.039 -0.020 -0.050*
(-2.693) (-2.387) (-2.474) (-2.178) (0.205) (-0.857) (-0.734) (-1.829)
N 3664 3541 3664 3541 3664 3541 3664 3541
No. Clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .023 .026 .013 .014 .017 .029 .049 .059
N left-censored 416 408 1646 1623
N right-censored 412 405 46 45
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
An observation is a 6-digit HS product category. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on
standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 6: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (HS6-Country
level)
Trade Regime: Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.101*** 0.292*** -0.020 0.053***
(3.819) (3.662) (-0.718) (2.620)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) 0.149*** 0.100*** 0.238*** 0.166*** -0.128*** -0.078 -0.321*** -0.225***
(4.323) (2.760) (4.596) (2.954) (-2.722) (-1.499) (-33.483) (-22.444)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.112*** 0.079*** -0.087*** -0.069***
(3.702) (3.635) (-3.157) (-15.512)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.107*** -0.096*** -0.207*** -0.191*** 0.022 -0.002 0.050*** -0.007
(-3.405) (-2.997) (-3.812) (-3.491) (0.778) (-0.055) (3.169) (-0.436)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 80474 77181 80474 77181 80474 77181 80474 77181
No. Clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .04 .039 .019 .019 .043 .045 .079 .08
N left-censored 18203 17406 64798 62683
N right-censored 28857 27968 2295 2143
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for OLS results.
t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Di¤erent
Country Groups) (HS6 level)
Import-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Group: LIC HIC USA JAPAN EUROPE_HIC EXCLUDE HK
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.134*** 0.075** 0.071** 0.085*** 0.111*** 0.089**
(3.731) (2.511) (2.258) (2.614) (3.166) (2.410)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.188*** 0.234*** 0.127*** 0.171***
(3.779) (2.906) (4.410) (4.570) (3.064) (3.374)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.130*** -0.119*** -0.169*** -0.106** -0.137*** -0.132***
(-2.946) (-2.817) (-3.974) (-2.543) (-3.667) (-3.059)
N 1491 3585 2460 2721 2560 3525
No. Clusters 282 346 321 331 323 347
No. Countries 47 59 1 1 38 233
R2 .044 .022 .034 .044 .03 .029
Pure-assembly
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Country Group: LIC HIC USA JAPAN EUROPE_HIC EXCLUDE HK
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) -0.060 -0.027 -0.028 -0.058 -0.055* -0.028
(-1.419) (-0.682) (-0.883) (-1.291) (-1.790) (-0.664)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) -0.064 -0.148** -0.182*** -0.226*** -0.126*** -0.155**
(-0.910) (-2.223) (-3.352) (-3.019) (-2.770) (-2.228)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) 0.006 0.028 0.066 0.058 0.036 0.020
(0.136) (0.626) (1.632) (1.222) (0.979) (0.451)
N 1491 3585 2460 2721 2560 3525
No. Clusters 282 346 321 331 323 347
No. Countries 47 59 1 1 38 233
R2 .0071 .018 .024 .042 .015 .021
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
Country classication by the World Bank according to GNI per capita in 2007. LIC stands for Low income countries. HIC
stands for High income countries. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country group. Standardized beta
coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 8: Productivity Dispersion and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Chinese
rms-sales-based dispersion measure) (HS6-Country level)
Chinese rms-sales-based dispersion measure
Trade Regime Pure-assembly Import-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill capital R&D skill capital R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dispersion 0.133*** 0.337*** 0.241*** 0.206*** -0.374** -0.061
(3.433) (3.881) (2.598) (2.857) (-2.466) (-0.312)
Dispersion interaction 0.153*** 0.202*** 0.063*** 0.148 -0.275*** -0.038
(3.329) (4.062) (2.797) (1.470) (-3.292) (-0.864)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 67952 67952 67952 67952 67952 67952
No. clusters 286 286 286 286 286 286
R2 .051 .057 .051 .047 .05 .046
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsExport Processing exports in each regime as a share of total Export
Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Regular coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats
based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L),
ln(K/L), ln(RD/Q) and ln(M/L). ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 9: Productivity Dispersion and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (export-
based dispersion measure) (HS6-Country level)
Chinese rms-export-based dispersion measure
Trade Regime Pure-assembly Import-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill capital R&D skill capital R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dispersion 0.032* 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.050 0.077 0.070
(1.691) (3.970) (2.597) (1.079) (1.421) (1.271)
Dispersion Interaction 0.037* 0.045*** 0.016*** -0.074 -0.023 -0.011
(1.932) (4.006) (2.674) (-1.559) (-0.784) (-0.941)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 76611 76611 76611 76611 76611 76611
No. clusters 310 310 310 310 310 310
R2 .046 .049 .048 .064 .063 .063
US rms-export-based dispersion measure
Trade Regime Pure-assembly Import-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure: skill capital R&D skill capital R&D
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dispersion 0.074 0.188*** 0.130** 0.090 -0.262*** -0.032
(1.543) (3.686) (2.398) (1.164) (-3.497) (-0.326)
Dispersion Interaction 0.060 0.094*** 0.026** 0.054 -0.165*** -0.016
(1.236) (3.700) (2.249) (0.685) (-4.475) (-0.811)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Headquarter intensity controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 77111 77111 77111 77111 77111 77111
No. clusters 316 316 316 316 316 316
R2 .046 .052 .048 .045 .05 .045
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsExport Processing exports in each regime as a share of total Export
Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Regular coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats
based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include ln(H/L),
ln(K/L), ln(RD/Q) and ln(M/L). *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 10: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (Using
Chinese data to measure factor intensities) (HS6-Country level)
Trade Regime: Import-assembly Pure-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Skill Int. 0.172*** 0.185*** -0.155*** -0.135***
(6.961) (7.691) (-5.915) (-5.171)
R&D+Adv. Int. 0.127*** 0.127*** -0.078*** -0.078***
(5.143) (5.139) (-2.861) (-2.910)
Capital Int. 0.016 -0.040 0.045 -0.106*** -0.065** -0.127***
(0.467) (-1.460) (1.309) (-3.112) (-1.995) (-3.840)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 80528 71116 80528 80528 71116 80528 71116 80528 80528 71116
No. Clusters 351 314 351 351 314 351 314 351 351 314
R2 .041 .029 .012 .043 .031 .052 .035 .04 .056 .051
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Skill intensity is measured by the average share of
high-school workers in the labor force of each sector, averaged across rms. Capital intensity is measured by the average ratio
of real value of capital to real output across rms. RD+Advert intensity is measured by the log ratio of the sum of R& D and
advertisement expenditure to value-added. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 11: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants (HS6-Country
level) (Large HS6 Sample)
Trade Regime: Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.100*** 0.282*** -0.012 0.080***
(3.716) (3.555) (-0.434) (4.058)
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) 0.153*** 0.104*** 0.239*** 0.168*** -0.131*** -0.081 -0.316*** -0.221***
(4.387) (2.854) (4.649) (3.053) (-2.825) (-1.580) (-34.104) (-22.694)
RD Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.110*** 0.076*** -0.084*** -0.065***
(3.591) (3.516) (-3.076) (-14.882)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.210*** -0.194*** 0.023 -0.001 0.051*** -0.004
(-3.440) (-3.047) (-3.850) (-3.541) (0.824) (-0.018) (3.369) (-0.288)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 77814 74617 77814 74617 77814 74617 77814 74617
No. Clusters 340 310 340 310 340 310 340 310
R2 .041 .04 .02 .019 .042 .044 .082 .082
N left-censored 17197 16442 62514 60468
N right-censored 27570 26719 2086 1947
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
The estimation sample for this table is restricted to the largest HS6 categories in export value, by dropping the bottom 3
deciles. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for OLS
results. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 12: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants, Pooled
Across Regimes, Dummy for Import-assembly
Trade Regime: HS6 HS6-Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D*Skill Intensity 0.101** 0.192*** 0.153*** 0.249***
(2.100) (4.415) (3.329) (5.964)
D*Capital Intensity 0.128*** 0.085* 0.158*** 0.103**
(2.637) (1.734) (3.917) (2.353)
D*R&D Intensity 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.053*** 0.063***
(3.881) (5.040) (3.913) (5.202)
D*Equipment Intensity 0.216*** 0.145*** 0.228*** 0.136***
(4.090) (2.838) (5.787) (3.324)
D*Plant Intensity -0.220*** -0.203*** -0.220*** -0.182***
(-5.043) (-4.753) (-6.066) (-5.198)
D*Material Intensity -0.072** -0.046 -0.016 0.018 -0.099*** -0.080** -0.045 -0.020
(-1.981) (-1.312) (-0.489) (0.562) (-2.887) (-2.296) (-1.446) (-0.642)
Skill Intensity -0.014 -0.050** -0.016 -0.045**
(-0.542) (-2.315) (-0.817) (-2.496)
Capital Intensity -0.045** -0.023 -0.048*** -0.029
(-1.970) (-1.043) (-2.688) (-1.450)
R&D Intensity -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.017***
(-3.500) (-3.958) (-3.168) (-4.267)
Equipment Intensity -0.083*** -0.060** -0.071*** -0.048**
(-3.413) (-2.420) (-4.062) (-2.552)
Plant Intensity 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.054***
(2.974) (2.738) (4.675) (4.175)
Material Intensity 0.003 -0.013 -0.005 -0.017 0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.011
(0.205) (-0.857) (-0.339) (-1.166) (0.820) (0.004) (-0.325) (-1.029)
Country xed e¤ects no no no no yes yes yes yes
N 7328 7082 7328 7082 160948 154362 160948 154362
No. clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .39 .4 .4 .41 .39 .4 .4 .41
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
An observation is a 6-digit HS product category in columns (1) to (4) and a 6-digit HS product category to each country in
columns (5) to (8). The estimation sample includes observations in both regimes, and D is a dummy variable for the
import-assembly regime. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Table A1: Summary Statistics of the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants Across HS6 Categories
Trade regime 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean #Obs.
Import-and-assembly 0 0.197 0.615 0.900 1 0.552 3825
Pure-assembly 0 0 0.002 0.091 0.365 0.106 3825
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Table A2: Summary Statistics of Headquarter Intensity Measures (Across SIC 4-digit Categories)
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean # of SIC
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) -1.330 -1.165 -0.973 -0.757 -0.557 -0.966 451
Capital Intensity, ln(K/L) -2.655 -2.272 -1.922 -1.458 -0.978 -1.862 451
R&D Intensity, ln (RD/Q) -6.269 -5.331 -4.474 -3.677 -3.012 -4.585 414
Material Intensity, ln (M/L) 0.378 0.665 1.025 1.423 1.904 1.092 451
Equipment Intensity, ln (E/L) -0.374 -0.015 0.425 0.910 1.465 0.487 451
Structure Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.717 -0.471 -0.128 0.339 0.789 -0.034 451
ln(high-sch emp/emp), Chinese plants, ln(H/E) -1.179 -1.031 -0.797 -0.618 -0.418 -0.811 513
ln(college em/emp), Chinese plants, ln(C/E) -3.069 -2.669 -2.273 -1.819 -1.437 -2.250 513
ln(real value K/real Y), Chinese plants, ln(K/Y) -1.336 -1.082 -0.814 -0.563 -0.086 -0.768 513
ln(R&D+Advert. Intensity), Chinese Plants, ln(RD/V) -7.051 -6.575 -5.949 -5.246 -4.493 -5.857 458
Table A3: Correlations Between Headquarter Intensity Measures (Across SIC 4-digit)
ln(H/L) ln(K/L) ln(RD/Q) ln(M/L) ln(E/L) ln(P/L) ln(H/E) ln(C/E) ln(K/ Y) ln(RD/V)
ln(H/L) 1.000
ln(K/L) -0.141 1.000
ln (RD/Q) 0.475 0.051 1.000
ln(M/L) -0.232 0.628 -0.196 1.000
ln(E/L) -0.257 0.774 -0.003 0.545 1.000
ln(P/L) -0.068 0.585 0.041 0.530 0.782 1.000
ln(H/E) 0.429 0.258 0.429 0.120 0.186 0.177 1.000
ln(C/E) 0.474 0.209 0.443 0.072 0.111 0.108 0.968 1.000
ln(K/Y) -0.065 0.256 0.099 -0.058 0.289 0.247 0.308 0.280 1.000
ln(RD/V) 0.413 0.024 0.425 -0.067 -0.116 0.002 0.519 0.562 0.084 1.000
Table A4: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants
HS6-Country HS6
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.123*** 0.345*** 0.091*** 0.108***
(4.585) (4.266) (2.830) (2.753)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.062** 0.020**
(3.335) (3.109) (2.244) (2.113)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.139*** 0.063** 0.224*** 0.123*** 0.105** 0.052 0.065** 0.035
(4.471) (1.992) (5.331) (2.762) (2.028) (0.969) (2.193) (1.073)
Plant Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.124*** -0.099*** -0.206*** -0.166*** -0.152*** -0.146** -0.097** -0.094**
(-3.587) (-2.829) (-3.464) (-2.775) (-2.680) (-2.543) (-2.428) (-2.288)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.066** -0.053 -0.151*** -0.129** -0.044 -0.029 -0.027 -0.017
(-2.221) (-1.625) (-2.813) (-2.196) (-1.072) (-0.707) (-0.941) (-0.573)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes no no no no
N 80474 77181 80474 77181 3664 3541 3664 3541
No. Clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .038 .033 .018 .016 .021 .02 .01 .0091
N left-censored 14899 14358 319 314
N right-censored 33454 32285 570 560
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsExport Processing exports as a share of total Export Processing
exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country in columns (1) to (4) and a 6-digit HS product
category in columns (5) to (8). Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A5: Headquarter Intensity and the Export Share of Vertically Integrated Plants
(HS6-Country level)
Trade Regime: Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill Intensity, ln(H/L) 0.151*** 0.428*** -0.064** -0.137***
(6.068) (5.894) (-2.437) (-6.931)
R&D Intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.134*** 0.095*** -0.100*** -0.079***
(4.777) (4.579) (-4.251) (-19.767)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.242*** 0.135*** 0.331*** 0.188*** -0.214*** -0.149*** -0.444*** -0.355***
(6.177) (3.457) (6.703) (3.590) (-4.103) (-2.633) (-24.316) (-19.532)
Plant Intensity, ln(P/L) -0.198*** -0.162*** -0.314*** -0.257*** 0.155*** 0.134*** 0.361*** 0.333***
(-5.512) (-4.580) (-5.258) (-4.321) (4.649) (4.187) (31.045) (27.242)
Material Intensity, ln(M/L) -0.059** -0.038 -0.128** -0.092 -0.008 -0.027 -0.016 -0.053***
(-1.975) (-1.209) (-2.377) (-1.641) (-0.307) (-1.009) (-0.905) (-2.922)
Country Fixed E¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 80474 77181 80474 77181 80474 77181 80474 77181
No. Clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .049 .046 .022 .021 .049 .052 .088 .091
N left-censored 18203 17406 64798 62683
N right-censored 28857 27968 2295 2143
Dependent Variable: Chinas foreign-a¢ liated plantsexports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports.
An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for OLS results.
t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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